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Note
Making Pesticides Public: A Disclosure-Based
Approach to Regulating Pesticide Use
Brian Jacobson
The last straw for Nick Messer, the owner of a small family
farm in Todd County, Minnesota, came when a gust of wind
blew a pesticide cloud straight toward his house, possibly ex1
posing his daughter Whitney to serious health effects. Mr.
Messer, who raises horses and dogs on his small farm, lost several animals to chemical-related illnesses after pesticides were
carelessly sprayed on adjacent fields, and sometimes even with2
in his own pasture. When his daughter was put at risk, Mr.
Messer and his family doctor stepped up their efforts to obtain
records of the circumstances surrounding the application of
pesticides on neighboring lands, but their repeated requests for
information from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture
3
were denied. Mr. Messer discovered that the records concerning pesticide application were classified as private under Minnesota law and protected from the public, thus frustrating his
desire to protect his family’s health and hold someone account4
able for the irresponsible spraying of chemicals.
Pesticide-application records are presumptively unavailable to the public because they are classified as private or non J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007,
St. Olaf College. Thanks to University of Minnesota Law School Professor Alexandra Klass and to Paul Liemandt for inspiration, key ideas, and helpful
feedback. Special thanks to Minnesota Law Review Editors Laura Arneson
and Jeremy Harrell for their encouragement and invaluable advice through
many revisions. Finally, thanks to my parents, Rolf and Virginia Jacobson,
and to my sister, Katie Jacobson, for all of their constant love and support.
Copyright © 2012 by Brian Jacobson.
1. Dan Gunderson, Pesticide Records Are Protected, MINN. PUB. RADIO,
(Feb. 17, 2003), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/02/18_
gundersond_fivepesticide/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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public data under Minnesota Statutes section 18B.37. As a result, absent a medical emergency, farmers and other landowners adjacent to fields where pesticides are applied have no
means of ensuring that chemicals are being applied safely and
in a way that minimizes the risk of damage to their families
6
and their livelihoods. This lack of access to information persists at a time when pesticide application, and the concomitant
7
risk of misuse, is steadily increasing.
Pesticide-registration and labeling-requirements are governed largely by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which does not provide for a private
8
cause of action. However, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to allow state common-law damage remedies by ruling that FIFRA did not
preempt common-law claims that were not competing require9
ments for labeling. And yet a lack of data about the circumstances in which pesticides were applied can make an individu10
al lawsuit expensive, risky, and often difficult or unsuccessful.
With individual citizens unable to access the data to protect
themselves, the task of regulating pesticide application falls to

5. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5 (2010).
6. Id. subdiv. 6. Even with this provision, however, it can be difficult for
a person who suspects she has been exposed to pesticides to ascertain what
kind of chemical was used and how it was applied, as evidenced by the case of
Nick Messer. See Gunderson, supra note 1.
7. See John H. Davidson, The Federal Farm Bill and the Environment,
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2003, at 3 (describing how the 750 million tons of pesticides that farmers apply to their crops each year contribute to
agricultural runoff ). Compare ARNOLD L. ASPELIN, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 1994 AND 1995 MARKET ESTIMATES 14 (1997) (4.4 billion total pounds of pesticides used in 1994), with
ARTHUR GRUBE ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY
SALES AND USAGE: 2006 AND 2007 MARKET ESTIMATES 10 (2011) (5.1 billion
total pounds of pesticides used in 2007).
8. See No Spray Coal. Inc. v. City of N.Y., 351 F.3d 602, 605 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting that in enacting FIFRA, Congress did not provide that its provisions might be enforced through a citizen suit, though it had done so in other
environmental protection statutes).
9. 544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005).
10. See Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and
Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 110 (2005).

2012]

PESTICIDE REGULATION

1125

11

state departments of agriculture, which for lack of funding or
12
resources cannot always carry out complete investigations.
This Note argues that making pesticide-application records
available to the public would provide harmed individuals with
the information to hold negligent applicators accountable and,
through the threat of litigation, provide an incentive for applicators to act responsibly in using pesticides, even before harm
is caused. Part I explores the classification of pesticideapplication records as nonpublic or private under the Minnesota Data Practices Act. Part II provides an overview of the theory and effectiveness of regulation by making information public
and accessible in environmental law. Part III discusses the new
availability of state common-law damages claims in pesticide
cases, and contends that such private enforcement could effectuate another type of regulation by information. This Note concludes by arguing that making data surrounding pesticide application available to the public is both an efficient and
equitable means to aid in the prevention of irresponsible pesticide use, and that states should adopt pesticide-use disclosure
programs to achieve this end. An increased receptivity to state
common-law claims for pesticide damages suggests that private
litigation represents a new opportunity to further strengthen
the regulatory influence of information disclosure.
I. DATA PRACTICES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INFORMATION
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), allowing the general public to obtain access to all federal agency records, subject to nine specifically enumerated ex13
ceptions. FOIA completely reformed government data practices, and reflected the growing importance placed on openness
14
and transparency in government. Upon signing the bill into
law, President Lyndon Johnson declared,

11. See, e.g., Pesticides: Overview, MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.
health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/pesticide/overview.html ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012);
Pesticide Enforcement Program, N.D. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.nd.gov/ndda
/program/pesticide-enforcement-program ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
12. See Gunderson, supra note 1 (noting that the MDA in certain circumstances just sends an advisory notice to sprayers who have broken the law,
and that warnings are more common than fines).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), ( b) (2006).
14. See Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to
Know: The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L.
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[t]his legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A
democracy works best when the people have all the information that
the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without inju15
ry to the public interest.

This commitment to openness and making information accessible has been taken up by the states as well, and today all
fifty states have some type of open records statute, many of
16
which are modeled on the federal FOIA.
Despite this emphasis on transparency and the availability
of government data, in many states pesticide-application data
collected by a government agency is treated differently. An informal survey conducted by the Association of American Pesticide Control Officers (AAPCO) indicated that the majority of
states have significant barriers to public access to pesticide17
application data. Many states, such as Minnesota, have cho18
sen to classify such data as private or nonpublic, and even
when states lack such an affirmative protection the investigating public often faces other obstacles to accessing chemical use
19
information. A look at data practices for pesticide-application
records in Minnesota shows how critical pesticide information
is often shielded from the public, and demonstrates the insufficiency of current federal and state reporting requirements for
ensuring responsible pesticide use. This Part provides an overview of the field of information regulation and suggests that a
similar approach might be effective in regulating pesticide application. Finally, the new receptivity to state common-law
claims indicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v.
REV. 41, 42 (1994) (“FOIA is intended to provide the citizenry with the
knowledge necessary to govern.”).
15. Statement by the President Upon Signing the “Freedom of Information Act,” 2 PUB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).
16. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002).
17. E-mails from Respondents to Association of American Pesticide Control Officers Survey, Question to State Lead Agencies: Privacy of Pesticide Application Records, to Paul Liemandt, Minn. Dep’t of Agric. (various dates in
2007) (on file with author).
18. See id.
19. In response to the AAPCO survey, several states indicated that although pesticide records were not addressed in data practices law, and thus
were not explicitly protected, as a practical matter public access to information
was very restricted. The Nebraska Department of Agriculture, for example,
responded that since pesticide information was not addressed by statute, it
would be up to the applicators to provide access to such records, and “the likelihood of that is nil.” Id.
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Dow Agrosciences LLC suggests that litigation presents a powerful new approach to complement the traditional regulatory
20
influences of information disclosure.
A. MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT DATA PRACTICES ACT
In 1974, shortly after Congress passed the federal Freedom
of Information Act, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Government Data Practices Act in response to the revelations of
government intrusion during the administration of President
21
Richard M. Nixon. The Act, set out in chapter 13 of the Minnesota Statutes, establishes a presumption that all government
22
data in Minnesota is available to the public. Its provisions ap23
ply to information in any form held by state agencies, Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, political subdivisions,
statewide systems, and corporations and nonprofit social ser24
vice agencies under contract with a government entity. This
presumption notwithstanding, the Act goes on to classify certain types of data as private or otherwise nonpublic, thus re25
stricting access to data. Data that is classified by statute as
other than public falls into one of four categories: private data,
26
confidential data, nonpublic, and protected nonpublic. Minnesota Statutes section 18B.37 governs pesticide-application information and recordkeeping requirements, and subdivision 5
makes clear that “the information in the records in this section
27
is private or nonpublic.”
Thus, despite the presumptive commitment to making government-collected data available to the public, Minnesota has
chosen to impose a high barrier to public access to pesticide28
application records. But even though the public lacks access,
federal and state statutes requiring applicators to keep accu29
rate records ensure that the records still exist. This means

20. 544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005).
21. Gary A. Weissman & Donald A. Gemberling, Access to Court Records
in Minnesota, BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 2008, at 30.
22. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subdiv. 1 (2010).
23. Id. subdiv. 7.
24. MATT GEHRING, MINN. H. RESEARCH DEP’T, MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT DATA PRACTICES ACT: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1 (2006).
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that the hard data needed to monitor pesticide use already exists—it is just not in the right hands.
B. PESTICIDE APPLICATOR RECORDKEEPING
Though the information is often hard to get at, federal and
state statutes mandate that pesticide applicators keep track of
the types of pesticides they use and the conditions in which the
pesticides are applied. The Federal Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (FACT) of 1990 requires certified pesticide applicators to maintain detailed records regarding the use
30
of restricted-use pesticides. The Pesticide Records Branch, established by the USDA to administer the recordkeeping provisions of FACT, monitors various agricultural industries to ensure that pesticide applicators maintain records in compliance
31
with federal regulations or recognized state regulations. This
oversight is carried out by state and USDA officials through co32
operative and interagency agreements. Among other things, a
typical application record requires the name of the product, the
total amount applied, and the date and location of the applica33
tion. FACT requires that the application information be recorded within thirty days of application, and that the record be
34
kept for a minimum of two years after each application.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) provides for the classification of different types of pesticides subject to recordkeeping requirements, and distin35
guishes between certain types of applicators. A pesticide is
classified as “restricted use” when the EPA has determined either that the pesticide presents a hazard to the applicator due
to its “acute dermal or inhalation toxicity,” or that “its use
without additional regulatory restriction may cause unreason36
able adverse effects on the environment.” Restricted-use pesti-

30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., FEDERAL PESTICIDE
RECORDKEEPING PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2009). When a state maintains
comparable recordkeeping regulations, the Pesticide Record Branch “allows
applicators in those States to comply with the State pesticide regulations, thus
eliminating the burden of maintaining duplicate [restricted-use pesticide] records.” Id.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 2.
34. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a).
35. Id. §§ 136–136y.
36. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C).
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cides may only be applied by certified applicators, while general
37
use pesticides can be applied by anyone.
Within the realm of restricted pesticide use, FIFRA further
distinguishes between private applicators and commercial ap38
plicators. A private applicator is one who uses, or supervises
the use of, restricted pesticides for agricultural commodity production on property owned or leased by himself or his employer,
while a commercial applicator is one who is hired to apply re39
stricted-use pesticides. Both are required to meet certain procedures and rules established by the EPA for qualifying for certification, but commercial applicators are held to much more
40
stringent standards. Both certified private and commercial
applicators must maintain records pursuant to the requirements set out in FACT, as well as any additional state-level
41
recordkeeping requirements.
In Minnesota, statutory pesticide-application recordkeeping requirements likewise apply to both commercial and non42
commercial applicators. The information required by those
statutes closely resembles the requirements of FACT and includes important data such as the date and time of the application, the location of the application, and the temperature, wind
43
direction, and wind speed at the time of the application. Copies of the application record must be kept for a period of five
years after the date of the treatment in Minnesota, three years
44
longer than the time period required by FACT. Furthermore,
Minnesota Statutes section 18B.064 mandates that the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) monitor urban and rural pesticide use, and collect pesticide-use information on a bi45
ennial basis. Specifically, the application data is to be
collected and automated consistent with the state’s land-

37. MICHAEL T. OLEXA, LAWS GOVERNING USE AND IMPACT OF AGRICULCHEMICALS: REGISTRATION, LABELING, AND THE USE OF PESTICIDES 1
(Fla. Coop. Extension Serv., Inst. of Food & Agric. Scis., Fact Sheet FRE-71,
1995).
38. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(2)–(3).
39. Id.
40. See OLEXA, supra note 37, at 2.
41. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a).
42. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2 (2010).
43. Compare the requirements in FACT, 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a), with the
Minnesota requirements, MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2.
44. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a) (two-year requirement), with MINN.
STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2(e) (five-year requirement).
45. MINN. STAT. § 18B.064.
TURAL

1130

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1123

management information system, which means that “the legislature directed the MDA to gather information enabling it to
know how much of what types of pesticides are used where in
46
the state.”
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF FIFRA REGULATION AND
RECORDKEEPING
Despite all the recordkeeping requirements and pesticideregistration standards detailed in FIFRA and Minnesota Statutes section 18B, these regulatory schemes have little effect on
47
ensuring responsible pesticide use. In large part, the problem
stems from the fact that these statutes clearly require pesticide
applicators to maintain records, but impose no requirements to
48
report those records to anyone. As some commentators have
observed, certified applicators must comply with both federal
and state recordkeeping requirements, “but they need not report the applications to anyone unless a federal agency . . . , state agency . . . , or health professional administering
medical treatment so requests or state law requires regular
49
disclosure.” Since there is no comprehensive reporting or disclosure requirement at the federal level, it is up to states to col50
lect or require disclosure of pesticide-application data. But as
noted above, Minnesota has indicated that such records are
51
considered private or nonpublic. Instead, FIFRA primarily
regulates pesticide-registration standards and labeling require52
ments, which are the basis for its enforcement provisions.

46. ROBERT M. ELEFF, MINN. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ADVOCACY, INACTION
SPEAKS LOUDER THAN WORDS: THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S FAILURE TO PROTECT MINNESOTA FROM PESTICIDE CONTAMINATION 49
(2001).
47. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 310 (2000) (“Direct regulation of farms . . . is
not a main concern of FIFRA; the statute does little more than require that
pesticides be applied by certified persons and consistent with their label instructions.”).
48. OLEXA, supra note 37, at 6 (“Certified applicators have no reporting
requirements under FACT . . . .”). Minnesota law, however, does require that
commercial applicators provide a copy of the pesticide-application record to the
customer. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2(d).
49. Ruhl, supra note 47, at 311.
50. Id. (“Although some states regulate pesticide applications more aggressively than does FIFRA, it is fair to say that the nation has no comprehensive regulatory framework governing farm use of pesticides.”).
51. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5.
52. See OLEXA, supra note 37, at 1–3.
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In Minnesota, the MDA has a statutory mandate to collect
pesticide-use data, and it can inspect and make copies of the
53
data as part of an investigation or enforcement action. Also,
when pesticide exposure is suspected of playing a role in a serious medical condition, a treating physician or veterinarian can
request such records for purposes of the diagnosis, care, or
54
treatment of a patient. Obviously, having access to application
information is crucial to ensuring responsible pesticide use and
55
protecting Minnesota’s people and natural resources. Practical
and financial concerns, however, often make it difficult—if not
impossible—for a state agency like the MDA to effectively fulfill
56
its role in collecting such information. A study by the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy indicated that the
MDA’s pesticide-use data collection efforts have been incomplete and inconsistent, and as a result the agency is largely ignorant about the patterns and trends of actual pesticide use in
57
the state. And although the MDA is authorized to inspect records as part of an official investigation if it has reason to suspect a violation, some sources suggest that violations are rarely
58
aggressively investigated and will often go unpunished. As the
case of Nick Messer demonstrates, even when pesticide exposure implicates human health, application records can be diffi59
cult to obtain.
Given the obstacles associated with agency limitations and
other barriers to accessing pesticide-application information, it
makes sense to take a new approach to the use of such data.
53. MINN. STAT. § 18B.064; id. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5 (“The commissioner
may enter a commercial, noncommercial, or structural pest control applicator’s
business and inspect the records required in this section at any reasonable
time and may make copies of the records.”).
54. Id. § 18B.37, subdiv. 6.
55. ELEFF, supra note 46 (“Few would argue that in order for the MDA to
effectively protect Minnesota’s resources against pesticide contamination, it
needs to know some basic information about how pesticides are actually used
in the state.”).
56. See, e.g., id. (“MDA has failed to effectively meet its statutory obligation to collect pesticide use data. It collects virtually no data on urban use and
very little on rural use.”).
57. See id. at 49–50.
58. See Dan Gunderson, Clouds of Doubt: Questions About Enforcement of
Pesticide Laws, MINN. PUB. RADIO, (Feb. 17, 2003), http://news.minnesota
.publicradio.org/features/2003/02/18_gundersond_onepesticide/ (describing findings of an MPR investigation showing that “violations of the law are often unpunished, and sometimes ignored,” and that “in some cases, even when the law
is clearly broken, the department takes no action”).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
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The field of information regulation suggests that implementing
data disclosure requirements can be a powerful alternative to
direct agency regulation.
D. INFORMATION REGULATION THEORY
Traditional government regulation, as carried out by various agencies, takes the form of a top-down, or command-and60
control, approach. In such a system, statutes and implementing rules tend to create direct restrictions on regulated parties,
often by way of establishing output performance standards or
61
requiring certain procedural characteristics. The relationship
between the agency responsible for regulation and the regulated party is usually direct, in the sense that both the regulatory
standards and enforcement actions are imposed directly on the
62
regulated party by the agency. While such top-down, direct
government regulation has long been entrenched as a central
63
feature of the American regulatory system, its shortcomings
have created a growing appreciation for a less costly, more effi64
cient approach to regulation. Direct command-and-control
regulation may be particularly poorly suited for the agricultural sector, and so a different regulatory strategy seems appro65
priate in the context of farms and pesticide application.

60. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (1985) (describing the “serious
inefficiency of traditional forms of command-and-control regulation,” and arguing that a market-based approach could help cure some of the existing
deficiencies).
61. Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 156 (1998).
62. Id. at 157 fig.1.
63. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 60, at 1334 (“The congressional
committees, government bureaucracies, and industry and environmental
groups that have helped to shape the present system want to see it perpetuated. . . . [T]he current system is also bolstered by an often inarticulate sense
that, however cumbersome, it ‘works,’ and that complexity and limited information make major improvements infeasible.”).
64. See William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 151 (2001) (“Although controlling social costs has long been a basic government function, direct government commands currently stand in low regard as a means of
controlling them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–19 (1999) (describing the surge in information regulation as a relatively recent phenomenon
tied to the rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s).
65. Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The
Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 622 (2010) (“The
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Information regulation, by contrast, has been defined as
“any regulation which provides to third parties information on
66
company operations.” In practice, information regulation can
take different forms, but generally requires that a regulated
entity disclose certain information regarding its performance or
procedure to the public with the hope of improving the entity’s
behavior or ensuring that it meets specified regulatory stand67
ards. Information regulation takes advantage of the influence
third parties can have on regulated entities by way of “supply[ing] ‘regulatory’ pressure through market dynamics, private
68
litigation, or moral persuasion.” Supporters of information
regulation cite its flexibility, potential for influence, and relatively minimal intrusion into the affairs of private entities as
reasons to extend the use of information-based regulatory
69
strategies. A disclosure-based approach to addressing social
costs can also “empower communities and citizen groups to address the problems disclosure reveals without the inefficiencies
and the overriding of local preferences that inevitably attend
70
national regulation.” And finally, implementing disclosure requirements helps avoid the burdens and high informational
costs associated with traditional agency promulgation of guidelines and rules, since “[i]nformation is the outcome of the program and is collected, not by an agency, but by the regulated
71
entity itself.”
An additional powerful, if slightly more controversial, tool
often facilitated by information regulation is the regulatory
pressure exerted by private litigation. Lawsuits brought by individual citizens have often played an important role in ensur72
ing regulatory compliance. Until recently, however, courts had
command-and-control environmental regulations that apply to most other
American industries do not apply to farming.”).
66. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61.
67. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 619 (“Some of these [disclosure requirements] are designed to assist consumers in making informed choices;
such statutes are meant to be market-enhancing. By contrast, others are designed to trigger political, rather than market, safeguards; such statutes are
meant to enhance democratic processes.”).
68. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 157.
69. See Pollans, supra note 65, at 634.
70. Pedersen, supra note 64.
71. Warren A. Braunig, Note, Reflexive Law Solutions for Factory Farm
Pollution, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1524 –25 (2005).
72. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 712–13 (2007) (describing the
success of tort litigation in regulating many dangerous or toxic products in
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interpreted federal law pertaining to pesticide-labeling requirements as preempting state common-law tort claims, minimizing the potential of private litigation in pesticide regulation. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC overturned the presumption of preemption,
and indicated a new willingness to consider state common law
73
claims in pesticide-related actions.
E. EXPANDED POTENTIAL FOR TORT LITIGATION CREATED BY
BATES
Though the threat of litigation frequently plays an important role in ensuring regulatory compliance, federal
preemption has long frustrated state common-law claims for
damages in the context of pesticide-related harms. Until recently, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) had posed a serious barrier to private recovery for an
individual who has suffered damages related to irresponsible
74
pesticide application. FIFRA contains a specific preemption
clause in a section covering uniformity, which states, “[s]uch
State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
75
required under this Act.” While on its face this provision does
not appear to automatically preempt state-law tort claims, it
had been held to have that practical effect because successful
state common-law actions might force pesticide manufacturers
76
to change their labeling or packaging. Thus, a successful
state-law tort claim for damages had the practical effect of imposing additional or different labeling requirements, and, argu-

situations where firm operators misrepresented or withheld critical pollution
information).
73. 544 U.S. 431, 440–43 (2005).
74. See Sherrie M. Flynn, FIFRA’s Puzzling Failure-To-Warn Preemption:
Pesticide Use and the Right-To-Know, 13 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 173, 176
(2003) (“[T ]he overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue
of whether failure-to-warn claims are preempted by FIFRA, including eight
federal circuit courts of appeal, have determined that they are.”); Klass, supra
note 10, at 118–19 (“Although some early cases had interpreted FIFRA
preemption narrowly to retain a significant role for common law tort claims,
they were quickly followed by decisions in nearly every federal circuit applying
FIFRA preemption broadly to prevent plaintiffs from using the tort law system to obtain compensation for pesticide-related harm and shape corporate
behavior.”).
75. 7 U.S.C. § 136v( b) (2006).
76. Flynn, supra note 74, at 182.
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ably, was preempted by section 136v(b) of FIFRA. Prior to
2005, the debate over the proper interpretation of this preemptive provision was shaped by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., in which the Court examined
78
the preemptive effect of the 1969 Cigarette Act. The language
of the Cigarette Act closely resembles the language of FIFRA in
that it forbids states from imposing any requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health “with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
79
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” In
holding that the state-law failure-to-warn claim was preempted, the Cipollone Court indicated that “[t]he phrase ‘no requirement or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no dis80
tinction between positive enactments and common law.”
The preemptive effect of FIFRA’s provisions narrowed significantly with the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Bates v.
81
Dow Agrosciences LLC. In Bates, the Supreme Court considered a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that a plaintiff’s
state-law claims for crop damages caused by the herbicide
“Strongarm” were preempted by FIFRA because recovery under
those claims would impose a labeling requirement in addition
82
to or different from those outlined in FIFRA. The Supreme
Court rejected this effects-based approach to interpreting
preemption, instead adopting an analysis that considered
whether the state-law claim would impose any requirements
83
that were more burdensome than those of FIFRA. Noting that
allowing certain private state-law claims “would seem to aid,
rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA,” the Court held
that “nothing in § 136v(b) precludes States from providing such
84
a remedy.” Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates,
state legislatures and courts are able to “create statutory and
common law damage remedies for violations of federal labeling
85
requirements.”

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
505 U.S. 504, 504 –05 (1992).
15 U.S.C. § 1334( b) (2006).
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Klass, supra note 10, at 124.
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The Supreme Court’s new receptivity to common-law tort
claims in pesticide exposure cases adds the possibility of a new
tool in information regulation. Though traditional information
disclosure systems have operated through the influence of public opinion and external monitoring pressures, the threat of a
tort lawsuit represents perhaps an even more powerful incentive for responsible use by pesticide applicators. An analysis of
existing information disclosure systems combined with the potential threat of tort litigation will show that public disclosure
of pesticide-application information can play a powerful regulatory role.
II. REGULATION BY DISCLOSURE AND THE POTENTIAL
OF LITIGATION
The idea of public information serving a regulatory function is far from new; disclosure requirements and information
dissemination assume a central role in regulatory strategies
adopted in other fields. The strategy is found most conspicuously in the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the public disclosure requirements throughout the federal secu86
rities laws. Other well-known examples of information regulation include the required disclosure of serious health risks by
the tobacco industry, the hazard communication programs
adopted by employers under OSHA, and the Food and Drug
Administration’s disclosure requirements through nutritional
87
labeling. Only recently, however, has information regulation
88
received much attention in an environmental context. This
Part analyzes the approach of information disclosure in an environmental context generally, identifying the factors that have
led to its largely successful implementation and arguing that
those same factors would translate to effective regulation in the
field of pesticide application. It then examines the evolution of
pesticide-use reporting requirements in California, and suggests that many of the initial burdens of adopting reporting re86. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 618 (noting the surge in agency regulation in the New Deal era and explaining that “disclosure of information became a pervasive regulatory strategy, most obviously through the work of the
Securities and Exchange Commission”).
87. Id. at 619–20.
88. David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,773, 10,773
(2001) (“Since 1970, ‘command-and-control’ has been the predominant form of
regulation used to implement environmental protection policy in the United
States.”).
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quirements will be avoided by learning from the lessons of its
reporting system. Finally, this Part responds to many of the
traditional criticisms of using litigation as a regulatory tool,
and argues that the newly created potential for common-law
damage claims will make disclosure requirements even more
effective.
A. SUCCESS OF DISCLOSURE IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, informational
89
regulation of environmental risks has grown in prominence.
One of the most prominent examples of largely successful information regulation in an environmental context is the use of
disclosure requirements implemented by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program. The success of this disclosure system in
raising public awareness of the dangers of toxic chemicals, and
spurring voluntary reductions in their release, provides a blueprint for pesticide-use disclosure programs.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA) established a Toxic Release Inventory in 1986 to
address the rapidly increasing use of toxic chemicals and their
90
release into the environment. The EPCRA gives the public the
right to know about toxic chemicals being released into the environment, and requires facilities in industries that manufacture, process, or otherwise use significant amounts of toxic
chemicals to file an annual report on their releases of these
91
chemicals. Businesses or industries that make use of chemicals considered toxic file a toxic-release chemical form with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that describes the
general use of the chemical, estimates the amount of the chemical on hand, reports the amount released into the environ92
ment, and identifies waste treatment or disposal methods.
The statute identifies a list of chemicals to be included in the

89. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 155 (discussing various examples of information regulation programs that emerged towards the end of
the twentieth century, such as the use of eco-labels, the disclosure requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments, and the consumer confidence reports
under the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2006).
91. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM
FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/tri_program_
fact_sheet.htm.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 11023; see also Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 155
n.3 (summarizing reporting requirements under EPCRA).
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93

chemical report, and provides for the EPA to make additions
upon determining that a chemical can reasonably be expected
94
to cause significant adverse human health effects. The statute
also requires the EPA to use the data obtained in these reports
to establish a national toxic chemical inventory in a computer
database, and to make that information accessible to the
95
public.
TRI was widely regarded as resoundingly successful in
bringing about voluntary toxic emissions reductions from the
96
facilities and industries it covers. From 1988 to 1999, TRI data on the consistently reported core industrial chemicals shows
that total toxic releases decreased by 45.5%, or 1.46 billion
97
pounds. Commentators credit several different features of the
98
TRI system with its overall effectiveness, and its success has
generated a great deal of academic interest and critical analy99
sis. Understanding the mechanism by which information disclosure systems like TRI operate is of paramount importance to
100
replicating their success. Before assuming that the success of
93. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (noting that the reporting requirements apply to
about 300 chemicals listed in S. REP. NO. 99-169 (1986)).
94. Id. § 11023(d)(2).
95. Id. § 11023( j).
96. David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 385–
86 (2005) (“[C]onsensus is widespread that TRI disclosure has induced significant voluntary reductions in covered releases well below levels otherwise required by existing command-and-control regulation.”); Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment: What Have We
Learned?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,425, 10,425 (2001) (“[T ]he
TRI program led to significant voluntary decrease in the total amount of TRI
chemicals released into the United States, beyond any mandated levels.”);
Sunstein, supra note 64, at 622 (“[The EPCRA] has been an exceptional success story, one that has well exceeded the expectations at the time of the statute’s enactment.”).
97. Lynn R. Goldman, Preventing Pollution? U.S. Toxic Chemicals and
Pesticides Policies and Sustainable Development, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 11,018, 11,029 (2002).
98. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 261–63 (2001) (noting that the interplay of various aspects of
TRI led to its success).
99. See Case, supra note 88, at 10,775 (“Although numerous examples of
informational regulatory approaches exist in the environmental arena, § 313 of
the [EPCRA] is perhaps the most widely analyzed example of this approach.”).
100. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426–28 (discussing the need to understand the mechanism by which information disclosure programs exert their
influence over covered industries and businesses); Archon Fung & Dara
O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Ex-
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information disclosure in one area will equate to similar results
in another context, it is important to understand how disclo101
sure requirements achieve their outcome.
For example, not only did TRI require the reporting of toxic-release information and provide it to the public, but it also
actively disseminated that information through media outlets
and well-recognized internet sources such as Environmental
102
Defense’s “Scorecard” website. This active dissemination of
information helped to ensure public involvement, and allowed
103
citizens to engage in monitoring and oversight. The influence
exerted by public opinion has played a heavy role in shaping
104
firms’ behavior. While traditional command-and-control style
regulation can mandate minimum standards that must be met
by firms, exposing toxic-release information to the public provides an incentive for firms to achieve even lower levels of toxic
105
chemical release. In response to negative attention from toxic-release information, some covered firms began voluntarily
publishing reports disclosing positive information about their

plaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL.
MGMT. 115, 115 (2000) (“By properly understanding the mechanisms that
drive TRI’s accomplishments, more intentional public policy designs can expand the system of populist maxi-min regulation and achieve even more rapid
toxics reduction.”).
101. Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426 (“[ W ]e cannot assume the success of
one program is transferable to another program unless we understand the
mechanism by which the first program succeeded.”).
102. Case, supra note 88, at 10,775; see also Cohen, supra note 96 (contending that part of TRI’s unique success is due to “new information technologies
( both hardware and software) that facilitate the dissemination of environmental information in a meaningful way”).
103. See Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 118 (“TRI data are now used
regularly by individuals, community-based organizations, environmental
groups, industry managers, state and federal agencies, lawyers, investment
advisors, and the media. Uses vary from educating and mobilizing affected
communities to assisting corporate environmental planning, from supporting
efforts to strengthen regulations to promoting voluntaristic environmental
initiatives.”).
104. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426 (“[T ]here is empirical evidence
that informal community pressure and social norms may play an important
role in emissions and/or compliance.”).
105. See Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 119 (“The TRI catalyzes the
involvement of ordinary people in the determination of toxics emissions standards by changing the effective limit that is publicly acceptable rather than legally allowable, whereas command-and-control policies leave discussions of
toxics to ‘experts’ in environmental agencies, industry, and sometimes environmental groups. Ordinary people, it seems, demand lower levels of toxics
than government regulators.”).
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106

environmental operation and performance. Some commentators have theorized that voluntary pollution reduction efforts
and positive reporting occur because TRI provides corporate
managers with information that they may not have had prior to
107
conducting TRI reporting. An early report from a chemical
industry participant confirmed these impressions, acknowledging that “[b]eing responsive to citizen concerns and communicating to make the public feel comfortable has changed the way
108
manufacturers do business.”
Another source of TRI’s success lies in its adoption of data
reporting in standardized units that allows for the easy comparison and analysis of toxic-release information across differ109
ent categories and industries. Whereas data reporting under
more conventional regulatory methods often elicited the minimum amount of data needed to verify compliance, mandatory
TRI reporting created an entire inventory of standardized statistics for use in comparison between firms and against histori110
cal performance. The use of standardized data reporting also
makes it easier for the EPA to maintain an intelligible database of this information in a way that is straightforward and
111
accessible to the public.
B. FINDING GUIDANCE IN ADOPTING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR PESTICIDES
Though information disclosure through TRI represents
somewhat of a singular success, the effectiveness of information
reporting requirements has given analysts hope that similar
112
results could be achieved in other environmental contexts. In106. Case, supra note 96, at 386.
107. Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 119.
108. Elizabeth A. Fisher, An Industry Perspective on Reporting Releases of
Toxic Chemicals, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REPORTING RELEASES
OF TOXIC CHEMICALS: NOVEMBER 13–15, 1991, at 33, 34 (1991).
109. Id. at 33–34.
110. See Karkkainen, supra note 98, at 261 (“Because TRI data are reported in standard units, they can be aggregated to produce profiles and performance comparisons at the level of the facility, firm, industrial sector, community, metropolitan region, state, watershed or other critical ecosystem, and the
nation as a whole.”).
111. Id.
112. See Case, supra note 88, at 10,775–76 (“The perceived success of the
TRI in effecting ‘voluntary’ performance improvements by regulated entities
has generated significant optimism among scholars and policymakers regarding the potential public policy benefits of expanding the use of informational
regulation as an environmental protection tool.”).
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formation disclosure in the context of pesticide use presents a
different challenge than the regulation of toxic releases since
the object is not to eliminate pesticides but rather ensure their
113
responsible use. Unlike toxic chemical releases, which are
undesirable side-effects of industrial practices, with pesticide
114
use the product itself is designed to be toxic. In pursuing disclosure regulation strategies, then, policy makers must bear in
mind that pesticide applicators’ incentives differ significantly
115
from those of corporate managers dealing with toxic waste.
Fortunately several states have already implemented some
kind of reporting system for certain types of pesticide applica116
tion, providing some guidance for future disclosure strategies.
117
118
119
California, New York, and Oregon were among the first
states to adopt extensive pesticide reporting systems. Since
then a few other states have followed suit and implemented
120
their own pesticide reporting requirements. Generally these
113. See Tom Tietenberg & David Wheeler, Empowering the Community:
Information Strategies for Pollution Control 5–6 (October 23–25, 1998) (working paper for Frontiers of Envtl. Econ. Conf.), available at http://www.p2pays
.org/ref/07/06539.pdf.
114. Id.
115. See id. (discussing the difference between pollution that is produced as
the byproduct of a process and pollution that arises from the use of a product).
116. SUSAN KEGLEY ET AL., HOOKED ON POISON: PESTICIDE USE IN
CALIFORNIA: 1991–1998, at 16 (2000) (“California has a unique pesticide use
reporting (PUR) system that other states in the U.S. are only beginning to
emulate.”).
117. Id. at 15–16 (“Full use reporting for agricultural and commercial applications of pesticides has been in place since 1990 in the form of the California Pesticide Use Reporting (PUR) system.”).
118. The Pesticide Reporting Law, N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/27506.html ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012)
(“The Pesticide Reporting Law (PRL) (Environmental Conservation Law Article 33, Title 12) was enacted on July 8, 1996. The New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) is responsible for implementing
the data collection portion of this law.”).
119. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OREGON PESTICIDE USE REPORTING SYSTEM:
ANALYTICAL REVIEW 7 (2000), available at http://library.state.or.us/repository/
2010/201007011250354/index.pdf (“New legislation (HB3602) directs the Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA) to establish a pesticide use reporting
system to provide government agencies, researchers, policy makers and the
public a comprehensive, reliable and cost effective system for collecting and
organizing information on all categories of pesticide use in Oregon, with the
goal of ensuring public health and safety, and protecting Oregon’s water and
environment.”).
120. Id. at 8 (noting that Arizona, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wisconsin,
and Massachusetts all have, or are in the process of adopting, pesticide-use
reporting requirements).
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programs have generated a positive response, but there is
still much room for improvement in data-collecting methods
122
and implementation. California, with its vast agricultural
systems and full-use pesticide reporting has been a leader in
123
tackling pesticide data collection. Therefore, an analysis of its
system will prove helpful. Though the initial adoption of its re124
porting system posed some challenges, California’s reporting
system has evolved to address many of those shortcomings, and
now serves as a model for states to follow in implementing disclosure systems.
The State of California has utilized some form of limited
pesticide-use reporting since at least 1950, when the California
Department of Food and Agriculture indicated that the county
agricultural commissioners required agricultural pest control
125
operators to submit monthly reports on their work. In 1990,
in response to demands for more comprehensive application reporting, California became the first state to require full report126
ing of agricultural pesticide use. Currently pesticide-use data
in California is collected by the state’s Department of Pesticide
Regulation (DPR), which analyzes the data through a number
127
of different metrics to assess dangers and identify patterns.
Copies of annual reports are made readily available on the DPR
website, and each report contains guidance as to how to access
128
and understand the data.
121. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 455 (2003) (arguing that a program like
California’s pesticide-use reporting system, if incorporated on a national scale,
would prove invaluable to farmworkers who suffered from pesticide exposure
poisoning incidents); Pesticide Use Reporting, CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REG.,
http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pur/purmain.htm ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (“California’s pesticide use reporting program is recognized as the most comprehensive in the world.”).
122. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116 (detailing some of the initial limitations of the California Pesticide Use Reporting System and recommending
improvements).
123. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 446 n.100 (“California is a
leader among the states because of its fairly detailed reporting system.”).
124. KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45–46.
125. CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, REGULATING PESTICIDES: THE
CALIFORNIA STORY 69 (Veda Federighi, ed., 2001), available at http://www
.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pressrls/dprguide/dprguide.pdf.
126. Pesticide Use Reporting, supra note 121.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, SUMMARY OF PESTICIDE USE REPORT DATA 2009, at 2–9 (2010), available at http://www.cdpr.ca
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California’s pesticide-use reporting system represents the
largest undertaking of its kind, and serves as a model for fu129
Notwithstanding the
ture pesticide disclosure programs.
overall success of requiring full pesticide-use reporting, several
commentators have noted that improvements to the reporting
system would help connect the required disclosure with actual
130
progress towards reduction of irresponsible use. When the
program was first implemented, delays in reporting, errors in
data collection, and increased agency workload often limited
the effectiveness of the data in achieving actual reductions in
131
irresponsible pesticide use. The sheer amount of full-use pesticide reporting data in California placed a heavy burden on the
state’s Department of Pesticide Regulation, and similar con132
cerns exist about disclosure systems in other states. Once application data is collected in a single system, the influence of
public perception and the threat of litigation help to minimize
the agency burden by encouraging the prevention of irresponsible application as opposed to correcting misapplication after the
133
fact.
C. REGULATORY INFLUENCE OF THE THREAT OF LITIGATION
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v.
134
Dow Agrosciences LLC, the public gained another tool in the
fight to ensure responsible pesticide use: the threat of tort liti.gov/docs/pur/pur09rep/comrpt09.pdf (explaining how pesticide data is used, as
well as commenting on and clarifying summaries of the data).
129. California Pesticide Use Reporting Data, PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK
PESTICIDE DATABASE, http://www.pesticideinfo.org/Docs/ref_PURCA.html#Missing
( last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (explaining that California’s pesticide-use reporting
system is one of the most comprehensive in the world).
130. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, AN OVERVIEW OF
CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUE FULL REPORTING SYSTEM 10 (2000), available at http://
www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pur/purovrvw/ovr52000.pdf (“Because full use reporting
was a major program that no other state had undertaken, it was inevitable
that there were problems to be worked out.”).
131. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45–46 (detailing several of the
problems with California’s pesticide-use reporting system and making recommendations to improve its practical effects).
132. See CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, supra note 130, at 7 (“This
increased workload [from full-use pesticide-application reporting] impacted
both DPR and the counties, and prompted DPR to analyze its operations and
evaluates ways to address the problem.”).
133. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45 (“An ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure, and the surest approach to risk reduction is continual
reductions in both the amount and intensity of pesticide use . . . .”).
134. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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135

gation. In fact, in deciding Bates, the Supreme Court specifically contemplated the role of tort litigation against irresponsi136
ble handlers of poisonous substances. Echoing the rationale
behind public disclosure systems like TRI, the Court also recognized that allowing common-law tort suits could incentivize
chemical manufacturers and applicators to “gain more information about their products’ performance in diverse set137
tings.” The Court clearly viewed common-law tort claims as
not only a means by which wrongly injured parties could receive compensation, but also as a tool for encouraging responsible and informed pesticide-use decisions: “By encouraging
plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries not previously recognized as
traceable to pesticides such as [the pesticide there at issue], a
state tort action of the kind under review may aid in the expo138
sure of new dangers associated with pesticides.”
Although the idea of private litigation playing a role in effective regulation is controversial, several commentators insist
that litigation can have an important supplementary function
139
as a regulatory tool. In the area of pesticide-use regulation,
where agency oversight is often found lacking in effectiveness,
the threat of litigation supplies a powerful incentive to pesti140
cide applicators to comply with government regulations. Furthermore, given the limitations on agency resources to pursue
thorough investigations of pesticide misuse, often times an injured party’s only recourse is through a state-law tort claim for
141
damages.

135. Klass, supra note 10, at 124 (“[D]evelopments in FIFRA preemption
and the common law as a result of Bates makes common law tort claims a
more promising approach today than it was prior to the Court’s decision.”).
136. Bates, 544 U.S. at 432–33 (“The long history of tort litigation against
manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the presumption against
pre-emption, for Congress surely would have expressed its intention more
clearly if it had meant to deprive injured parties of a long available form of
compensation.”).
137. Id. at 451.
138. Id. (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541–42
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
139. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 72, at 695 (“[ I ]n addition to its critical
role in compensating victims, the tort system plays an indispensable role in
supplementing agency regulation of risky products and activities.”).
140. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 629–30 (discussing the role of citizens
suits as an ex ante deterrent and an ex post corrective on regulated party
behavior).
141. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 471 (“[F ]armworkers must
rely on common law tort theories in order to obtain recovery for their injuries.”).
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One of the traditional criticisms of regulation through litigation involves the high costs of gaining access to crucial in142
formation through the judicial process. This complaint rings
particularly true for parties who have been injured through
pesticide exposure, because in many states the only way to access that information is by initiating a risky and expensive
143
lawsuit. Even though state government agencies typically
144
have the authority to access pesticide-use information, laws
that confer protected status on such data often impose high
practical impediments for a party that suspects misuse has oc145
curred.
One of the biggest barriers facing a potential litigant who
has suffered harm from pesticide exposure is the need to show
the causal link between the misapplication of chemicals and
146
the damage done. Just as in any other toxic tort case, a plaintiff in a pesticide tort action “must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the pesticide exposure caused her injury or
147
was at least a substantial contributing factor to the injury.”
Establishing causation in the face of a dearth of information
surrounding the circumstances of the suspected misapplication
means that the litigant is confronted with at best an immensely
costly information-gathering process, and at worst an insur148
mountable barrier to recovery.
Given the new potential for the role of litigation in insuring
responsible pesticide use, state laws frustrating that possibility
142. See Wagner, supra note 72, at 697 (“When manufacturers conceal information about product risks, they insulate themselves from accountability
for the harms they might be causing to society. This privately held information
can constitute a costly barrier—sometimes an insurmountable one—to regulating product and related industrial risks.”).
143. See Klass, supra note 10 (explaining that because pesticide data is not
available to individuals when the harm occurs, such lawsuits are costly and
difficult).
144. See MINN. STAT. § 18B.37 (2010).
145. See Wagner, supra note 72, at 698 (“While in theory the legislative and
executive branches should be able to access a great deal of private information, the political nature of the process imposes real and often quite stark
limits on the nature and extent to which regulation-relevant information is
actually accessed and made more generally available to the public.”).
146. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 482 (“Regardless of
what theory of recovery plaintiffs assert in pesticide cases, the primary difficulty for most farmworkers will be establishing a causative link between the
pesticide exposure and the resultant injury.”).
147. Id. at 483.
148. See id. at 490–97 (discussing the various burdens a farmworker faces
in establishing causation in a pesticide tort case).
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by shielding application data should be repealed. Instead,
states should move toward adopting comprehensive, full-use
pesticide reporting systems, such as the program implemented
in California.
III. TRENDING TOWARD DISCLOSURE
Pesticide reporting systems that make chemical application data presumptively available to the public will dramatically lower the costs of pesticide tort litigation by providing easy
access to the very evidence needed to show that pesticide misuse occurred. With the removal of one of the principal barriers
to a successful tort suit for pesticide-related damages, the
threat of liability for irresponsible pesticide use becomes too big
149
for applicators to ignore. Furthermore, the chilling effect of
the threat of litigation, as well as public-image concerns, will
mitigate some of the commonly criticized high costs associated
with disclosure systems and the use of litigation as a regulatory
tool. States should shift away from laws that protect pesticideuse information and move towards disclosure systems like California’s to create an environment that pressures pesticide applicators to make certain of responsible use or face the threat of
litigation. Minnesota should lead the way by repealing subdivision 5 of section 18B.37 so that chemical use data becomes presumptively available to the public, and by adopting a reporting
system to make pesticide information easily accessible. The
burden of implementing such a system is relatively small, given
that much of the data is already being recorded, and the cost is
justified by the equitable concern of allowing victims of irresponsible pesticide use a viable remedy.
A. INCENTIVES FOR RESPONSIBLE USE CREATED BY PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE
While the initial change in disclosing such information
may result in costly lawsuits, having access to the correct information will increase an injured party’s chances of just compensation, and will eventually lead to changes in applicator be150
The principal effect of pesticide-use information
havior.

149. See id. at 471 (“[P]esticide applicators—who typically work on a contract basis for growers—may be liable for a host of injuries resulting from the
misapplication of pesticides and field drift.”).
150. See id. at 505 (“[T ]ort actions can raise the price of maintaining the
status quo for growers and manufacturers. By providing agribusiness with an
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disclosure will be to bring about behavior modification in the
form of responsible pesticide use in response to the threat of litigation. The traditional influences of information disclosure—
public opinion, external monitoring, and third-party involvement—will also play a prominent role as tort lawsuits put the
151
The
public spotlight on irresponsible pesticide practices.
pressures created by public knowledge of pesticide-application
practices gives applicators a powerful incentive to use utmost
care when using toxic chemicals.
Though the threat of litigation provides the rhetorical
stick, data disclosure systems also offer pesticide users a carrot.
Just as the information that came to light under the Toxic Release Inventory resulted in favorable public reviews from conscientious, toxic-release-reducing firms, large farms and agribusinesses stand to gain significant positive publicity by
touting their responsible pesticide-use record. Even smaller
farms lacking a public profile have a great deal to gain through
the disclosure of their responsible chemical practices. Since the
great majority of pesticide application occurs in rural farming
areas, strong ties of community often exist to bind neighbors
and provide incentives to cooperate and insure the health of the
152
community. Some instances of rural community negotiations
have led to “good neighbor” agreements where farmers have
voluntarily agreed to reduce the amount of pesticides applied in
153
sensitive areas such as near homes or schools. If mandatory
disclosure of toxic chemical releases motivated large industrial
operations to reduce emissions to avoid being seen as a bad
154
neighbor, such programs would be even more effective in rural farming areas with strong community ties.

incentive to reform its ways, litigation brought by farmworkers may compensate only a few, but catalyze changes that benefit many.”).
151. See, e.g., Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 118.
152. See California Pesticide Use Reporting Data, supra note 129
(“[K]nowledge of typical pesticide applications by a particular grower has led
to negotiations between farmers and community members in an attempt to
reduce pesticide use near homes, schools, and parks.”).
153. Id.
154. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking
U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 593, 645 (2010) (“Experience with the TRI has shown that simply requiring industrial operations to report to the public the types and amount of
toxic releases from industrial facilities results in significant reductions of toxic
releases, in part because industry will voluntarily reduce its admissions to
avoid being seen as a ‘bad neighbor’ . . . .”).
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Furthermore, although some information reporting and
disclosure systems are criticized on the grounds of the prohibi155
tive cost, pesticide-application information avoids this complication since most of the data needed to establish a reporting
156
system is already compiled by users and applicators. As discussed above, the Federal Pesticide Record Keeping Program
requires private and commercial applicators to maintain fairly
detailed records regarding the circumstances surrounding each
157
application. Since most of the data needed to establish a database is already on-hand with pesticide applicators, there is a
much lower initial cost to creating a publicly accessible system
of pesticide-use information. Thus a pesticide-use reporting
system represents a relatively low-cost and effective way to ensure lawful and responsible pesticide application. And even
though some initial costs related to implementing public disclosure and allowing private lawsuits are inevitable, the evidence
suggests that the huge benefits to the public of responsible pes158
ticide use likely outweighs those costs.
B. DISCLOSURE IS AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
Beyond the argument that pesticide-use disclosure leads to
an efficient way of regulating pesticide applicators, making
such information available to the public is also an equitable
measure. Toxic chemicals such as restricted-use pesticides present an extreme hazard to humans and animals residing in an
159
area where they are regularly applied. People who are at risk
of pesticide exposure have a right to know when, where, and
how pesticides are applied so that they can take the appropri160
ate measures to protect themselves. This concern is already
reflected in the labeling and registration requirements intend155. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 626–27 (suggesting that information
disclosure systems implemented by the FDA or under OSHA are extremely
expensive due to the cost of obtaining information); ELEFF, supra note 46, at
54 (“An objection sometimes made against [a pesticide-use data collecting] system is the alleged record-keeping burden it places on applicators.”).
156. ELEFF, supra note 46, at 54 (“[A] significant proportion of applicators
already are required to keep records of their pesticide use.”).
157. See supra notes 25–29, and accompanying discussion.
158. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 72, at 711.
159. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 438–39 (“Ingested
and absorbed every day through the field worker’s nose, mouth, and skin, pesticides are toxic substances designed to kill living organisms.”).
160. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45 (arguing that growers, farmers, and consumers have a right to know about the hazards associated with
the potential adverse health effects of pesticide exposure).
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ed to protect persons who are applying pesticides. Federal law
imposes a high level of scrutiny before a toxic chemical can be
161
registered for use as a pesticide. The same care should be
taken to use pesticide-application data in protecting parties
who risk exposure even though they are not themselves utilizing chemicals.
The costs of pesticide application are unequally distributed
across society. Although consumers benefit from the advantages of pesticides in agriculture just as surely as agricultural producers and pesticide applicators, persons who reside in
rural areas with a high risk of exposure to these chemicals bear
162
a disproportionate share of the burden. By making application data available to the general public, a semblance of balance is restored. Traditionally disadvantaged parties, such as
farmworkers or rural residents, gain a means to protect themselves when they have access to the information about pesticide
application in their area. The increased viability of litigation
after critical facts are made available provides victims of irresponsible pesticide use with a just remedy. Making pesticideapplication information available to the public is the first step in
re-establishing a fair distribution of the costs of pesticide use.
CONCLUSION
Based on the ascendancy of information regulation theory
and the success of pesticide reporting programs in those areas
that have adopted them, other states should implement a similar reporting requirement that would make pesticideapplication data available to the public. Although information
disclosure programs in the environmental context have typically operated through market mechanisms, public opinion and
other social pressures, the increased availability of state tort
claims will exert an even more effective pressure on pesticide
applicators to use chemicals in a responsible manner. Though
litigation as a regulatory tool has been criticized as expensive
and inefficient, much of this criticism is based on the high cost
161. See OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING PESTICIDES UNDER THE
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT 27 (1982).
162. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 447 (“While pesticide
producers, users, and consumers benefit from the use of pesticides . . . costs
are distributed disproportionately throughout the population (in terms of
acute and chronic toxic effects such as cancer).” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, supra
note 159)).
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of obtaining information needed to proceed with a lawsuit. This
barrier to litigation, however, vanishes when pesticideapplication information is made easily accessible through a
public pesticide-use reporting system. The knowledge that pesticide-use data, and thus any evidence of misuse, is readily
available to the public incentivizes pesticide applicators to ensure that their use is responsible and in compliance with labeling requirements and regulations. Pesticide-use reporting and
public disclosure thus provides a powerful supplement to traditional regulatory methods, and helps encourage lawful and safe
pesticide application.

